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Introduction
In this chapter I seek to provide a theoretical defence of workplace democ-
racy that is independent from and outside the lineage of Marxist and com-
munist theory. Common to the council movements, anarcho- syndicalism 
and many other forms of libertarian socialism was the idea “that workers’ 
self- management was central.”1 Yet the idea of workers’ control has not 
been subject to the same theoretical development as Marx’s theory, not to 
mention capitalist economic theory. This chapter aims to contribute at a 
theoretical level by providing a justification and defence of self- managed 
workplaces that is independent of the particular historical tradition of the 
council movements.
There is a clear and definitive case for workplace democracy based on 
first principles that descends to modern times through the Reformation and 
Enlightenment in the abolitionist, democratic and feminist movements. 
By the twentieth century, the arguments had been scattered and lost  – 
like the bones of some ancient beast scattered in a desert  – partly due 
to misconceptions, mental blocks and misinterpretations embodied 
in Marxism, liberalism and economic theory. When one has worked 
through some of these intellectual roadblocks, then one may be better 
able to reassemble the case for workplace democracy from well- known 
first principles developed in the abolitionist, democratic and feminist 
movements.
The Basic Misconception of Liberalism
The modern liberal consciousness was formed in the nineteenth century 
with the abolition of slavery and the triumph of political democracy as 
the normative ideal in the West. Both changes were interpreted as moving 
from a coercive system to a system based on consent. Thus “consent” 
became the root principle of liberalism (always in the European sense of 
classical liberalism), a principle further exemplified with the post- socialist 
resurgence of market societies.
 
 
 
 
 
The Case for Workplace Democracy 211
21
But this “liberal principle of consent” is both a conceptual oversimplifi-
cation of the issues as well as a historical falsification of the debates. There 
were always sophisticated arguments for slavery and for non- democratic 
forms of government based on consent. The advances in anti- slavery 
arguments and democratic arguments based on the inalienable rights 
arguments of the Reformation and Enlightenment were made against those 
liberal defences of slavery and autocracy based on consent. These inali-
enable rights arguments have been largely lost to modern liberalism (not 
to mention, neoclassical economics) with its dumbed- down dichotomy of 
“coercion versus consent.” Of course, there were always illiberal defences 
of slavery and autocracy (e.g. racist arguments or divine- right theories), 
and those are precisely the ones propped up as strawmen and then batted 
down by liberal philosophers and intellectual historians as they portray the 
triumphal march “from Status to Contract.”2
Slavery
Take slavery. The contractual arguments for slavery go back even to 
antiquity. In Justinian’s codification of Roman law, each of the three legal 
means of becoming a slave had an incidence of contract. One means was 
an explicit contract to sell one’s labour services all at once, the self- sale 
contract. Another means was the practice of allowing prisoners of war to 
plea bargain a lifetime of labour instead of being executed. Finally, those 
who were born slaves received food, clothing and shelter from their masters 
and they could (by manumission) pay off  this liability inherited from their 
mothers’ contractual condition, or they could continue the arrangement 
for another generation.
Frank Knight pointed out that the foundations of classical liberalism 
were laid well before Adam Smith: “Interestingly enough, the political and 
legal theory had been stated in a series of classics, well in advance of the 
formulation of the economic theory by Smith. The leading names are, of 
course, Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone.”3 All three of these classical 
liberal writers accepted a voluntary slavery contract as long as there was 
some semblance of rights on both sides, for example, so that a master may 
not arbitrarily kill his slave. Here are the three pertinent quotations:
For, if  once Compact enter between them, and make an agreement 
for a limited Power on the one side, and Obedience on the other, the 
State of War and Slavery ceases, as long as the Compact endures … 
I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other Nations, that Men 
did sell themselves; but, ’tis plain, this was only to Drudgery, not to 
Slavery. For, it is evident, the Person sold was not under an Absolute, 
Arbitrary, Despotical Power.4
This is the true and rational origin of that mild law of slavery which 
obtains in some countries; and mild it ought to be, as founded on the 
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free choice a man makes of a master, for his own benefit; which forms 
a mutual convention between two parties.5
Yet, with regard to any right which the master may have lawfully 
acquired to the perpetual service of John or Thomas, this will remain 
exactly in the same state as before: for this is no more than the same 
state of subjection for life, which every apprentice submits to for the 
space of seven years, or sometimes for a longer term.6
In the American debates over slavery, people like Reverend Samuel 
Seabury gave perfectly liberal contractarian defences of slavery  – while 
George Fitzhugh and a host of others gave illiberal and racist arguments.7 
The reader is invited to see which strawmen are propped up and batted 
down in the standard histories of the slavery debates. For instance, modern 
liberal scholars of pro- slavery thought can’t seem to find Seabury or any 
of the earlier contractarian defences. Eric McKitrick collects essays of 15 
pro- slavery writers;8 Harvard University’s current president, Drew Gilpin 
Faust,9 collects essays from seven pro- slavery writers; and Paul Finkelman 
collects 17 excerpts from pro- slavery writings.10 But none of  them include 
a single writer who argues to allow slavery on a contractual basis such 
as Seabury  – not to mention Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Blackstone, 
Montesquieu and a host of Scholastics such as Jean Gerson, Luis de 
Molina and Francisco Suarez.11
As was pointed out by some pro- slavery writers, the essential economic 
difference between the slave and the hireling is the amount of labour 
purchased at once:
With us this property does not consist in human “flesh” … Our prop-
erty in man is a right and a title to human labor. And where is it that 
this right and title does not exist on the part of those who have the 
money to buy it? The only difference in any two cases is the tenure … 
Our slave- property lies only incidentally in the person of the slave but 
essentially in his labor. Who buys a slave except he has work for him? 
His person is held as the only sure means of obtaining his labor. The 
proprietorship of his person extends only so far as the derivation of 
a fair amount of labor. The value of the slave is determined by the 
sort and amount of labor he is capable of and it is according to these 
that he is bought and sold; and it is undeniable that these are the same 
conditions which determined the hireling’s wages.12
Or as James Mill, the utilitarian liberal and father of John Stuart Mill, 
pointed out:
The labourer, who receives wages sells his labour for a day, a week, 
a month, or a year, as the case may be. The manufacturer, who pays 
these wages, buys the labour, for the day, the year, or whatever period 
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it may be. He is equally therefore the owner of the labour, with the 
manufacturer who operates with slaves. The only difference is, in 
the mode of purchasing. The owner of the slave purchases, at once, 
the whole of the labour, which the man can ever perform: he, who pays 
wages, purchases only so much of a man’s labour as he can perform in 
a day, or any other stipulated time.13
If  a contractual relationship to buy “the whole of the labour, which the 
man can ever perform” was morally wrong in spite of being voluntary, 
then the current economic system based on the voluntary contract for the 
shorter- term purchase of labour “for the day, the year, or whatever period 
it may be” might be put in moral jeopardy. Hence responsible intellectual 
historians and liberal scholars just cannot go there.
Today, the reigning social model finds its “scientific” expression in the 
neoclassical model of competitive capitalism which not only allows, but 
requires for efficiency, complete future markets in all goods and services 
including labour. Although self- sale contracts were outlawed when slavery 
was abolished, the shining exemplar of liberal thought (the neoclassical 
economic model) requires that such lifetime labour contracts be re- allowed 
in order to get the basic efficiency results.
Now it is time to state the conditions under which private property and 
free contract will lead to an optimal allocation of resources … The 
institution of private property and free contract as we know it is modi-
fied to permit individuals to sell or mortgage their persons in return 
for present and/ or future benefits.14
To place emphasis on the libertarian logic of freedom, the late Harvard 
philosopher, Robert Nozick, has argued that a free system would allow 
an individual “to sell himself  into slavery.” As if  to emphasise the modern 
learned ignorance of Enlightenment inalienable rights doctrine, Nozick 
even reinterprets an “inalienable” right as a right that one may not give up 
without consent – which just identifies “inalienable rights” with “rights” as 
opposed to privileges. Nozick thus has no notion whatever of “inalienable 
rights” in the original sense of a right that one may not give up even with 
consent (e.g. due to the inherent invalidity of the contract to alienate any 
rights one has qua person).
Non- democratic Government
The contractual arguments for allowing non- democratic government also 
go back to antiquity and continue down to Nozick. Any rulership that 
existed as a settled condition was interpreted as based on an implicit con-
tract or covenant with the people  – settled by the prescription of time. 
In the Institutes of  Justinian, we find that the Roman people have by the 
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lex regia enacted the imperium of  the ruler. The German legal scholar, 
Otto Gierke, finds that by the late Middle Ages, it was propounded as a 
philosophical axiom that rulership was based on a voluntary contractual 
alienation of rights from the ruled to the ruler, the contract of subjec-
tion or pactum subjectionis.15 Or as medieval scholar Brian Tierney pointed 
out: “The idea that licit rulership was conferred by consent of the commu-
nity to be ruled was fairly commonplace at the beginning of the fourteenth 
century.”16 Surely the best- known version of this doctrine was Thomas 
Hobbes’ theory of contractual autocracy. To avoid the war of all against 
all that would make life “nasty, brutish, and short,” each along with the 
other would alienate the right of self- determination to the sovereign. This 
liberal tradition of non- democratic government based on the “consent of 
the governed” continues down to Harvard’s poster- child for free- market 
principles whose libertarian vision of a free system would allow the pactum 
subjectionis where individuals contract away their governance rights to a 
“dominant protective association.”17
This completes the summary of the basic misconception of liberalism, 
that the abolition of slavery and the triumph of political democracy 
represented a decision for consent over coercion. The older non- trivial 
debate, lost to modern liberalism, was not between consent and coercion but 
between two opposite forms of consensual arrangements. It was between 
a Hobbesian contract to alienate the rights of self- determination and a 
democratic constitution to secure those rights which are only delegated to 
the governors/ managers.
During the Middle Ages the question was much debated whether 
the lex regia effected an absolute alienation (translatio) of the legis-
lative power to the Emperor, or was a revocable delegation (cessio). 
The champions of popular sovereignty at the end of this period, like 
Marsiglio of Padua in his Defensor Pacis, took the latter view.18
The non- trivial argument for democracy was not the usual liberal stance in 
favour of consent instead of coercion, but the inalienable rights argument 
against the voluntary alienation contract and in favour of the voluntary 
delegation contract.
There is, at least, one right that cannot be ceded or abandoned: the 
right to personality. Arguing upon this principle the most influential 
writers on politics in the seventeenth century rejected the conclusions 
drawn by Hobbes. They charged the great logician with a contradic-
tion in terms … There is no pactum subjectionis, no act of  submission 
by which man can give up the state of  free agent and enslave him-
self. For by such an act of  renunciation he would give up that very 
character which constitutes his nature and essence: he would lose his 
humanity.19
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It means, as the examples of modern economics and philosophical libertar-
ianism illustrate, that the non- trivial inalienable rights arguments against 
such alienation contracts have been “forgotten.” And for good reason. As 
Philmore put it, perhaps ironically:
Contractual slavery and constitutional non- democratic government 
are, respectively, the individual and social extensions of the employer– 
employee contract. Any thorough and decisive critique of voluntary 
slavery or constitutional non- democratic government would carry 
over to the employment contract – which is the voluntary contractual 
basis for the free market free enterprise system.20
Thus the “problem” is that when the old inalienable rights arguments are 
understood in clear and modern terms, then it is quickly seen that the 
arguments cut far deeper than just ruling out buying other people and pol-
itical autocracy – they also rule out the renting of persons and the work-
place pactum subjectionis of  the employment contract.
A Linguistic Glass Wall in Capitalist Talk
Let us pause to consider an amusing invisible barrier in “capitalist talk.” 
Suppose a person lived in the middle of a slave society (e.g. the antebellum 
American South). Surely when asked if  they knew of a society based on 
owning other human beings, they would recognise their own society as 
an example. Now consider present- day society and consider the following 
experiment the author has conducted with economics students.
First the students are told about the system of chattel slavery where 
workers are bought and sold as moveable property. But just as a house or a 
car can be bought and sold, so one can also rent a house or car. Now instead 
of buying workers as in a slavery system, suppose we consider a system 
of renting workers. The students are asked if  anyone knows an economic 
system based on the renting of workers. There is usually a puzzled silence. 
A Black student might point out that during slack times in the period of 
slavery, plantation slaves were rented out to work as stevedores, as hands in 
factories (e.g. turpentine or sugar mills) or as common labourers. The pro-
fessor agrees, but asks again for an example of a whole economic system 
based on renting people. After another pause, some students offer, “well, 
what about feudalism?” The professor responds that feudalism might be 
seen as based on the voluntary homage contract that permanently attached 
the serf  to the manor and was not a temporary rental contract. Thus we still 
need an example of a system of renting people. After more embarrassed 
silence and shuffling feet, finally a student, by the process of elimination if  
by no other logic, offers: “Well, isn’t that sort of like what we have now?”21
Yes, except that we use the word “hiring” or some other euphemism 
(“employing” or “giving a job”) instead of “renting” when people are 
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rented in an employment contract. Economists can sometimes be quite 
frank about the matter. As the late dean of neoclassical economics, Paul 
Samuelson, put it: “Since slavery was abolished, human earning power is 
forbidden by law to be capitalised. A man is not even free to sell himself: he 
must rent himself  at a wage.”22 Or as other neoclassicals put it:
To clarify our discussion of capital we … emphasize two crucial 
distinctions: between stocks and flows, and between rental payments 
and asset prices. We begin with the example of labour input … The 
labour market trades a commodity called “hours of labour services.” 
The corresponding price is the hourly wage rate. Rather loosely, we 
sometimes call this the “price of labour.” Strictly speaking, the hourly 
wage is the rental payment that firms pay to hire an hour of labour. 
There is no asset price for the durable physical asset called a “worker” 
because modern societies do not allow slavery, the institution by which 
firms actually own workers.23
Hiring and renting are used interchangeably when referring to cars (e.g. 
“hire- car” in the UK instead of “rental- car” in the US), but not for people. 
Learning this unwritten rule is part of being socialised into a society based 
on renting human beings. Try it on your friends.
The “R”- Word That Cannot Be Spoken in Economics
The “science” of economics has even stronger unwritten rules as to what 
words and concepts can be used. Certain facts, known to all, are quite 
unmentionable in this “science.” For instance, we all know that only people 
can be blamed or held responsible for anything. We all might occasion-
ally indulge animistic metaphors about “things” being blamed for some 
outcome, but we are well aware of the metaphor. We know, for example, 
that when a crime is committed, the responsibility for the crime must be 
imputed back through the tools or instruments to the human users. When 
we do not blame the knife or gun for a crime, we do not think for a moment 
that the instrument was therefore of no “help” to the perpetrator in the 
commission of the crime (and thus some crimes and many accidents might 
be prevented if  such tools were scarcer). Of course, such instruments have 
some efficacy in crimes; otherwise they would not be used. But we have no 
trouble differentiating that efficacy from responsibility for the crime. No 
trouble, that is, unless one is a professional economist who must, in the 
interests of science, “overlook” what everyone knows.
This simple and definitive differentiation of human actions from the ser-
vices of things on the basis of the “R”- word, “responsibility,” has been lost 
to economics for the whole twentieth century. In economics, human actions 
and the services of things are seen alike as having a causal efficacy called 
“productivity” and they are represented symmetrically as input services 
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in “production functions.” Economists flip- flop between two symmetrical 
pictures of the production process. When feeling scientific, economists adopt 
an engineering mentality and a passive voice; the inputs are technologically 
transformed into the outputs. When economists wax poetical, then all the 
inputs (such as land, labour and capital) co- operate together to produce the 
product. “Together, the man and shovel can dig my cellar” and “land and 
labor together produce the corn harvest.”24 At all costs, the asymmetrical 
picture is avoided where persons use up materials and the services of the 
instrument to produce the outputs – thereby producing the “whole product” 
(see below) with its negative and positive components.
Long years of rigorous economic training are necessary in order to 
“forget” such an obvious difference between persons and things. The 
payoff from this rigorous indoctrination can be seen by investigating any 
economics textbook. Before the twentieth century, there was a darkness 
over the land and muddle- headed political economists like Thomas 
Hodgskin and other classical labourists had some sort of “labour theory” 
that tried to treat labour as having some “mysterious” attribute funda-
mentally different from the services of things.25 What could it be? Then 
around the turn of the twentieth century, a light burst over the land as the 
theory of marginal productivity emerged to solve the “problem of imput-
ation.” Every principles text, from Marshall’s and Samuelson’s to their vast 
contemporary progeny, discusses (and dismisses) the “labour theory” and 
presents marginal productivity theory.
The reader is invited to try to find a single economics text in the entire 
twentieth century which even mentions the simple fact that only human 
actions (labour services) are imputable – that responsibility must be imputed 
back through whichever instruments and tools to the human users. For a 
couple of decades, I have offered any fellow economist a free lunch if  they 
find such a text, but to no avail. Failing that, one begins to appreciate the 
power of capitalist indoctrination in the “science” of economics.
One has to go back to the legally trained nineteenth- century Austrian 
economist, Friedrich von Wieser, to find any non- metaphorical mention of 
the R- word in the economics literature:
The judge … who, in his narrowly- defined task, is only concerned with 
the legal imputation, confines himself  to the discovery of the legally 
responsible factor, – that person, in fact, who is threatened with the 
legal punishment. On him will rightly be laid the whole burden of the 
consequences, although he could never by himself  alone  – without 
instruments and all the other conditions – have committed the crime. 
The imputation takes for granted physical causality … If it is the moral 
imputation that is in question, then certainly no one but the labourer 
could be named. Land and capital have no merit that they bring forth 
fruit; they are dead tools in the hand of man; and the man is respon-
sible for the use he makes of them.26
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There is a common pose that orthodox economists are scientifically 
judging the existing human rental system according to some norma-
tive principles such as Pareto optimality  – analogous to the political 
economists, jurisprudents and philosophers in the antebellum American 
South who pretended to be judging their peculiar institution according to 
some moral principles and who unsurprisingly never supported any knock- 
down inalienable rights arguments against the institution. The social 
role of “economics” in our society based on human rentals suggests the 
opposite direction of causality. Normative principles are judged according 
to whether or not they align with the social role of orthodox economics in 
giving a “scientific account” of the existing or perhaps an idealised human 
rental system.
For instance, Wieser actually summarises the essentials of the labour 
theory of property (juridical imputation principle) critique of the employ-
ment system: “Land and capital have no merit that they bring forth fruit; 
they are dead tools in the hand of man; and the man is responsible for the 
use he makes of them.”27 But that gives Wieser no second thoughts about 
the system of renting human beings; it only proves that the usual moral 
(factual) or legal notions of imputation obviously do not apply! Apparently, 
the usual moral/ legal notions of imputation and responsibility apply to 
some other world than the world with which economists deal. It would be 
an economic reductio ad absurdum to apply the usual moral/ legal notion 
of imputation to production since it conflicts with the liberty of renting 
human beings in the free market free enterprise system! The social role of 
economics in the human rental system demands a new notion of “economic 
imputation” in accordance with another new notion of economic respon-
sibility:  “In the division of the return from production, we have to deal 
similarly … with an imputation, – save that it is from the economic, not the 
judicial point of view.”28 By defining “economic responsibility” in terms of 
the animistic version of marginal productivity, Wieser and later orthodox 
economists can finally draw the conclusion demanded by their professional 
vocation: to show that the competitive human rental system “economically” 
imputes the product in accordance with “economic” responsibility.
Thus we arrive at one of the high points of neoclassical microeconomics:  
trying to justify a metaphorical imputation of “distributive shares” in the 
product rights with a metaphorical notion of “responsibility.” In contrast, 
the modern treatment of the labour theory of property (i.e. based on the 
juridical imputation principle) deals with the imputation of the “return 
from production” precisely from the moral, legal or “juridical point 
of view.”
The Fundamental Myth of Capitalist Property Rights
The last ideological misconception that we can consider is about the struc-
ture of property rights in production. The labour theory of property is 
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about the appropriation of newly produced property. The standard view 
pretends that no appropriation takes place in capitalist production since 
the right to the product is supposedly already part of the “private owner-
ship of the means of production.” Any appropriation, where the labour 
theory might be applied, could only be situated in some original state of 
nature when the first means of production were being appropriated, and in 
any case all that is lost in the mists of the past.
But the “story” is false from the beginning. The rights to the product are 
not part of the “ownership of the means of production” (private or other-
wise); that is the fundamental myth sponsored by Marxist as well as orthodox 
economists. Appropriation does take place in normal production, not just in 
some original state of nature. Indeed, there is a market mechanism of appro-
priation quite unnoticed by conventional economics which buys the myth that 
the product is already part of the “ownership of the means of production.”
Consider a technically defined production opportunity wherein people 
use some materials and a widget- maker machine to produce widgets. The 
“fundamental myth” is that the right to the product is part and parcel 
of the ownership of the capital good, the widget- maker machine. In this 
simple form, the myth is easy to defeat. Have labour hire capital or have 
some third party hire both. Then the hiring party would own the product, 
not the owner of the machine.
But that insight is much more “difficult” to grasp if we put the capital 
assets inside a corporate shell. Incorporate a company and have the owner of 
the widget- maker machine contribute it to the company in return for the only 
shares. Then he is the owner of the company and would “supposedly” be the 
owner of whatever is produced using the capital assets of the company (that 
is, the widget- maker machine). Isn’t that what corporate ownership means? 
But that is again false for the same reasons. The machine can be rented out 
by the company. When the machine is rented out, then the company would 
not be the owner of the product produced using the company’s capital assets 
(the machine). The company would only be an input- supplier to the “firm” 
or “enterprise” using the machine. Yet the original owner of the machine is 
still the owner of the company. This is a point about the structure of prop-
erty rights, not marketplace power relations. The ownership of the product 
produced with a company’s capital assets is not part and parcel of the owner-
ship of the company. That is the fundamental myth about capitalist property 
rights.
It is the direction of the hiring contracts (who hires what or whom) that 
determines who bears the input- liabilities and who thus appropriates the 
output- assets – not the “ownership of the means of production.” One party 
buys or already owns all the inputs to be used up in production and then, 
having absorbed those input- liabilities, can lay sole legal claim on the new 
produced assets.
The idea that the product was part of the “ownership of the means 
of production” was crystallised by Marx and thus he named the system 
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“capitalism.” It is a misnomer. The product rights are not part of capital. 
Both Marxists (and by virtue most council theorists) and the defenders of 
“capitalism” agreed on the myth that the owner of capital was the “owner 
of the firm”; they agreed to disagree on whether that “owner” should be 
public or private – so that the Cold War was much like a modern version of 
the Peloponnesian War between the Athenians who had privately owned 
slaves and the Spartans who had publicly owned slaves.
The Case for Workplace Democracy
The Labour Theory of Property
We are now in a position to briefly state the case for the democratic 
firm based on ordinary jurisprudence. I will state the case based on the 
“labour theory of property”  – which is just the ordinary juridical prin-
ciple of assigning legal responsibility in accordance with de facto or fac-
tual responsibility.
Regardless of the productivity of the instruments and materials of pro-
duction, only the human beings involved in the firm can be de facto respon-
sible for producing the product. But hordes of textbook- trained economists 
immediately throw up their hands and point out that you can’t impute the 
entire output to labour (“labour” = “managers and workers”); the product 
must be divided to account for the income to the other inputs! But they are 
wrong; they just think too positively. They must learn to think negatively. 
There is also a negative product. Labour does not produce the product ex 
nihilo; labour produces the product by using up the input materials and 
the services of the capital instruments. And thus labour is also de facto 
responsible for that negative product (and the satisfaction of those input- 
liabilities accounts for the other factor incomes). The positive and negative 
product, the (undivided) produced assets and input- liabilities, make what 
we might call the whole product.29 It is not described by a number but by an 
ordered list of positive and negative numbers, a “vector.”
The imputation principle (assign the legal responsibility to the de facto 
responsible party) implies that labour should have the legal responsibility 
for the positive and negative fruits of their labour. In the nineteenth century, 
Hodgskin and others asserted “Labour’s Right to the Whole Product.”30 
Labour should be legally liable for the used- up inputs and should legally 
own the produced outputs; labour should be the firm. The net value of 
whole product is the “residual,” so the responsibility argument concludes 
that labour ought to be the residual claimant.
The Analogous Case for Abolishing the Coverture Marriage Contract
Historical examples of voluntary contracts that have been abolished due 
to the abolitionist, democratic and feminist movements are, respectively, 
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the voluntary slavery contract, the non- democratic political constitution 
(pactum subjectionis) and the coverture marriage contract. Since the cov-
erture contract is the most recent example, it may be useful to review the 
inalienable rights argument against that free and voluntary contract. Note 
that we are not playing the usual left- wing parlour game of escalating one’s 
notion of “voluntariness” until the contract we want to rule out is seen as 
being “involuntary.” The inalienable rights critique applies even if  it is per-
fectly voluntary.
Normally, to establish a legal guardian relationship of one adult as 
guardian over another adult as dependant, there must be some factual con-
dition on the part of the dependant such as some mental disability, insanity 
or senility that needs to be certified. Yet the coverture marriage contract 
established the husband as the “Lord and Baron” or, in less flowery lan-
guage, guardian over the feme covert who had no independent legal per-
sonality and thus could not make contracts or own property except in the 
name of the husband:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the 
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the 
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of 
the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs 
everything; and is therefore called in our law- French, a feme covert, 
and is said to be under the protection and influence of her husband, 
her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her 
coverture.31
In an adult woman of normal capacity, that factual capacity is factually 
inalienable in the sense that the woman cannot by voluntary agreement 
actually alienate that capacity and factually become a person of diminished 
capacity, a dependant, factually suitable for a guardianship relation. Yet 
the coverture contract gave her precisely that legal position (note that the 
point is the contrast between the factual and the legal situation). Since the 
woman is just as much a de facto capacitated adult as before voluntarily 
agreeing to the contract, the coverture contract was essentially an insti-
tutional fraud sponsored by the legal system in a patriarchal society that 
allowed the reduction of married women to the status of legal dependants 
to parade in the form of a voluntary contract. The critique of the human 
rental or employment contract is entirely analogous using the usual notions 
of factual and legal responsibility as applied to the appropriation of the 
liabilities and assets created in production.
The Case for Abolishing the Human Rental Contract
The inalienable rights argument against not only buying but renting people 
can be illustrated with a simple story. Suppose that an entrepreneur hired 
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an employee for general services (no intimations of criminal intent). The 
entrepreneur similarly hired a van, and the owner of the van was not 
otherwise involved in the entrepreneur’s activities. Eventually the entrepre-
neur decided to use the factor services he had purchased (man- hours and 
van- hours) to rob a bank. After being caught, the entrepreneur and the 
employee were charged with the crime. In court, the worker argued that he 
was just as innocent as the van owner. Both had sold the services of factors 
they owned to the entrepreneur. “Labor Service is a Commodity.”32 The 
use the entrepreneur makes of these commodities is his own business.
The judge would, no doubt, be unmoved by these arguments. The judge 
would point out it was plausible that the van owner was not responsible. 
He had given up and transferred the use of his van to the entrepreneur, so 
unless the van owner was otherwise personally involved, his absentee own-
ership of the factor would not give him any responsibility for the results 
of the enterprise. But man- hours are a peculiar commodity in comparison 
with van- hours. The worker cannot “give up and transfer” the use of his 
own person, as the van owner can the van. Employment contract or not, 
the worker remained a fully responsible agent knowingly co- operating 
with the entrepreneur. The employee and the employer share the de facto 
responsibility for the results of their joint activity, and the law will impute 
legal responsibility accordingly:
All who participate in a crime with a guilty intent are liable to pun-
ishment. A master and servant who so participate in a crime are liable 
criminally, not because they are master and servant, but because they 
jointly carried out a criminal venture and are both criminous.33
Unless one wants to argue that employees suddenly become robots or some 
sort of non- responsible instruments to be “employed” by the “employer” 
when the venture “they jointly carried out” was non- criminal, then the 
employees (and working employer) in an enterprise are jointly factually 
responsible for using up the inputs (i.e. creating the input- liabilities) and 
producing the products (i.e. the output- assets) that make up the negative 
and positive components in the “whole product” representing the whole 
results in a productive opportunity.
Thus, by the usual juridical norm of imputation, they should jointly 
have the legal liabilities for using up the inputs and the legal ownership of 
the produced outputs. Yet, the employees, qua employees, have 0 per cent 
of the input- liabilities charged against them and 0 per cent of the produced 
outputs owned by them, which is exactly the legal role of a rented non- 
responsible instrument. Anyone who can tell the difference between 0 per 
cent and 100 per cent can see that the whole “distributive shares” in the 
product are only metaphorical property rights. The employer holds 100 per 
cent of the input- liabilities and owns 100 per cent of the produced outputs. 
Yet the employees are as inextricably and inalienably co- responsible (in 
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factual terms) as in the case of the criminal venture. That is (one form 
of) the inalienable rights argument that descends from the Reformation 
(where it took the form of the “inalienability of conscience”) and the 
Enlightenment.
The employees cannot by any voluntary act turn themselves into de 
facto non- responsible instruments, just as the married woman cannot 
voluntarily alienate her adult capacity to become a de facto dependant. 
The whole contract to rent human beings is another institutional fraud 
legally sponsored by a society based on renting (instead of owning) other 
humans so that the positive and negative fruits of the rented people can 
be appropriated by the employer. Thus the neo- abolitionist claim that the 
employer– employee contract for the renting of human beings is inherently 
invalid.34
Generalising from these two cases, one can see the general form of 
the inalienability argument against personal alienation contracts. Any 
contract that puts a normally capacitated person in the legal position of 
a person of  diminished capacity or non- capacity cannot actually be vol-
untarily fulfilled to factually justify that legal role. The person remains 
a person. Hence the legal authorities always must have an alternative 
factual performance that will legally count as “fulfilling” the contract, 
and that factual performance always has the same form:  obey your 
master, obey your ruler, obey your husband or obey your employer. The 
resulting legal contract is only an institutionalised fraud parading on 
the stage as a voluntary contract (i.e. with voluntary obedience) to allow 
the “legalised” treatment of  normal persons as having only diminished 
or no capacity.
Unlike the coverture marriage contract, the human rental contract is still 
legally valid. Perhaps 100 or even 50 years from now, today’s good- hearted 
orthodox economists, lawyers, political scientists and liberal intellectuals 
will be looked back upon and asked in absentia: “Just which part of renting 
human beings didn’t you understand?”
Notice that this argument is entirely independent of the size of the wage 
or quality of working conditions, and has no connection to any theory 
of price or value including any so- called “labour theory of value.”35 The 
parallel argument from democratic theory arrives at the same conclusion 
about the employment contract except that it is then viewed as the private 
Hobbesian pactum subjectionis of  the workplace. The fact that a whole 
economic civilisation is founded on a bogus “contract” (the contract to 
rent human beings) to transfer what is untransferable is “unbelievable” 
to most people – which is why so much false consciousness needs to be 
socially constructed to sustain the system. While the earlier systems of 
legalised violations of human rights had their platoons of intellectual mer-
cenaries, no previous system had anything approaching the sophistication 
of orthodox economics, political science, legal theory and the other social 
sciences.
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Justice and Injustice
Whenever two things ought to match, like being a legal and factual 
dependant or being legally and factually responsible for something, then 
there are two ways to have a mismatch – like the type I and type II errors in 
statistics. It is an injustice when there is a mismatch. For instance, when a 
factually guilty person is judged legally not guilty, that is a miscarriage of 
justice – analogous to a type I error of rejecting a true hypothesis. Or when 
a factually innocent person is found to be legally guilty, that is also a mis-
carriage of justice – like the type II error of accepting a false hypothesis.
In the case at hand, both errors occur. The factually responsible party or 
association, the people working within a firm, do not get the legal respon-
sibility for the whole product, and the party or association that does get the 
legal responsibility, such as the corporate shareholders in the employing 
corporation, do not have the factual responsibility. In a remarkable case 
of courage and clarity, the British Conservative minister and writer, Lord 
Eustace Percy, precisely pointed this out in 1944:
Here is the most urgent challenge to political invention ever offered 
to the jurist and the statesman. The human association which in fact 
produces and distributes wealth, the association of workmen, man-
agers, technicians and directors, is not an association recognised by 
the law. The association which the law does recognise – the association 
of shareholders, creditors and directors – is incapable of production 
and is not expected by the law to perform these functions. We have to 
give law to the real association, and to withdraw meaningless privilege 
from the imaginary one.36
Conclusion
The workers’ councils of the European council movements can be seen 
as the self- conscious eruption in history of what Percy called the “human 
association which in fact produces and distributes wealth, the association 
of workmen, managers, technicians and directors.”37
“For many, the workers councils became a viable alternative to the capit-
alist economic system and the established political order, the cells of a future 
self- managed society.”38 Yet no matter how attractive the direct action and 
general strike strategies have been to express left- wing enthusiasms and 
being- against- the- system posturing, they have hardly proved successful as 
a shortcut through history. Particularly now in the twenty- first century, 
after the collapse of much of the Left in the late twentieth century, there 
seems to be no real alternative to Rudi Dutschke’s “long march through 
the institutions of power.” This includes refounding the intellectual case of 
workplace democracy – our task here – in a way quite distinct from and for 
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the most part antithetical to Marxist theory, not to mention “real- existing 
Marxist socialism.”39
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 2 Henry Maine, Ancient Law, 100.
 3 Frank Knight, Freedom and Reform, 27, fn. 4.
 4 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, Second Treatise, §24.
 5 Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Vol. I, Bk. XV, Ch. V.
 6 William Blackstone, Ehrlich’s Blackstone, section on “Master and Servant.”
 7 Samuel Seabury, American Slavery Justified by the Law of Nature.
 8 Eric McKitrick, Slavery Defended.
 9 Drew Faust, The Ideology of Slavery.
 10 Paul Finkelman (ed.), Defending Slavery.
 11 On the Scholastics, see Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories.
 12 Edward Bryan, Letters to the Southern People, 10 (italics in original); partly 
quoted in J. Philmore, “The Libertarian Case for Slavery,” 43.
 13 James Mill, Elements of Political Economy, ch. I, section II.
 14 Carl Christ, “The Competitive Market and Optimal Allocative Efficiency,” 
334; quoted in Philmore, “The Libertarian Case for Slavery,” 52.
 15 Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age.
 16 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 182.
 17 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 15, 113.
 18 Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional 
Law, 4.
 19 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, 175.
 20 Philmore, “The Libertarian Case for Slavery,” 55.
 21 Stanley Engerman, “Some Considerations Relating to Property Rights in 
Man,” 43– 65.
 22 Paul A. Samuelson, Economics, 52, italics in original.
 23 David Begg et al., Economics, 201.
 24 Samuelson, Economics, 536– 7.
 25 Hodgskin, The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted.
 26 Friedrich von Wieser, Natural Value, 76– 9.
 27 Ibid.
 28 Ibid., 76.
 29 In the neoclassical literature, this standard vector is called the “input– output 
vector” as in James Quirk and Rubin Saposnik, Introduction to General 
Equilibrium Theory and Welfare Economics, 27; or “production vector” or just 
“production.”
 30 Anton Menger, The Right to the Whole Produce of Labour. See also David 
Ellerman, Property & Contract in Economics; David Ellerman, “The Labour 
Theory of Property and Marginal Productivity Theory”; David Ellerman, “On 
the Labor Theory of Property”
 31 Blackstone, Ehrlich’s Blackstone.
 32 Armen Alchian and William R. Allen, Exchange and Production, 469.
 33 Francis Batt, The Law of Master and Servant, 612.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226 David Ellerman
26
 34 David Ellerman, “On the Renting of Persons.”
 35 David Ellerman, “Marxism as a Capitalist Tool.”
 36 Eustace Percy, The Unknown State, 38.
 37 Ibid.
 38 Comack, Wild Socialism, 75.
 39 There is also the task of rethinking the legal structure of the self- managed 
democratic firm to avoid the problems of the hybrid “socialist” firms in the 
only previous historical example of a country attempting to be politically and 
economically self- managed, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See 
David Ellerman, The Democratic Worker- Owned Firm.
References
Alchian, Armen and William R. Allen. Exchange and Production: Theory in Use. 
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1969.
Batt, Francis. The Law of Master and Servant. 5th edn. London: Pitman, 1967.
Begg, David, Stanley Fischer and Rudiger Dornbusch. Economics. 5th edn. 
London: McGraw- Hill Co., 1997.
Blackstone, William. Ehrlich’s Blackstone. Edited by J.  W. Ehrlich. New  York:   
Capricorn Books, 1959.
Bryan, Edward B. Letters to the Southern People. Charleston, SC: Walker, Evans 
& Co., 1858.
Cassirer, Ernst. The Myth of the State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963.
Christ, Carl F. “The Competitive Market and Optimal Allocative Efficiency.” In 
Competing Philosophies in American Political Economics. Edited by John Elliott 
and John Cownie. 332– 8. Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear, 1975.
Comack, Martin. Wild Socialism: Workers Councils in Revolutionary Berlin 1918– 
21. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2012.
Corwin, Edward S. The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional 
Law. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955.
Ellerman, David. The Democratic Worker- Owned Firm. London: Unwin- Hyman 
Academic, 1990. Accessed at www.ellerman.org.
— — — . “On the Labor Theory of Property:  Is the Problem Distribution or 
Predistribution?” Challenge:  The Magazine of Economic Affairs 60, no. 2 
(2017): 171– 88.
— — — . “The Labour Theory of Property and Marginal Productivity Theory.” 
Economic Thought 5, no. 1 (2016): 19– 36.
— — — . “Marxism as a Capitalist Tool.” Journal of Socio- Economics 39, no. 6 
(December 2010): 696– 700.
— — — . Property & Contract in Economics:  The Case for Economic Democracy. 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993.
— — — . “On the Renting of Persons: The Neo- Abolitionist Case Against Today’s 
Peculiar Institution.” Economic Thought 4, no. 1 (2015): 1– 20.
Engerman, Stanley. “Some Considerations Relating to Property Rights in Man.” 
Journal of Economic History 33, no. 1 (1973): 43– 65.
Faust, Drew Gilpin (ed.). The Ideology of Slavery:  Proslavery Thought in the 
Antebellum South, 1830– 1860. Baton Rouge, LA:  Louisiana State University 
Press, 1981.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Case for Workplace Democracy 227
27
Finkelman, Paul (ed.). Defending Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Old South – 
A Brief History with Documents. Boston, MA: Bedford/ St. Martin’s, 2003.
Gierke, Otto von. Political Theories of the Middle Age. Translated by F. W. 
Maitland. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1958.
Hodgskin, Thomas. The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted. 
Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley, 1973 [1832].
Hoffrogge, Ralf. Working Class Politics in the German Revolution: Richard Müller, 
the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the Origins of the Council Movement. 
Translated by Joseph B. Keady. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
Knight, Frank. Freedom and Reform. New York: Harper & Row, 1947.
Locke, John. Two Treatises on Government. New  York:  New American Library, 
1960 [1690].
McKitrick, Eric. Slavery Defended: The Views of the Old South. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice- Hall, 1963.
Maine, Henry. Ancient Law. London: Dent, 1972.
Menger, Anton. The Right to the Whole Produce of Labour:  The Origin and 
Development of the Theory of Labour’s Claim to the Whole Product of Industry. 
Translated by M. E. Tanner. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1970 [1899].
Mill, James. Elements of Political Economy. 3rd edn. London: Baldwin, Cradock, 
and Joy, 1826.
Montesquieu, Baron de. The Spirit of the Laws. Translated by Thomas Nugent. 
New York: Appleton, 1912 [1748].
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Pannekoek, Anton. Workers’ Councils. Edited by Robert F. Barsky. Oakland, 
CA: AK Press, 2003.
Percy, Eustace. The Unknown State:  16th Riddell Memorial Lectures. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1944.
Philmore, J. “The Libertarian Case for Slavery: A Note on Nozick.” Philosophical 
Forum 14 (1982): 43– 58.
Quirk, James and Rubin Saposnik. Introduction to General Equilibrium Theory and 
Welfare Economics. New York: McGraw- Hill, 1968.
Samuelson, Paul A. Economics. 10th edn. New York: McGraw- Hill, 1976.
Seabury, Samuel. American Slavery Justified by the Law of Nature. Miami, 
FL: Mnemosyne Publishing Company, 1969.
Tierney, Brian. The Idea of Natural Rights:  Studies on Natural Rights, Natural 
Law, and Church Law 1150– 1625. Grand Rapids, MI:  William B.  Eerdmans 
Publishing, 1997.
Tuck, Richard. Natural Rights Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979.
Wieser, Friedrich von. Natural Value. Translated by C. A. Malloch. New York: G. E. 
Stechert and Company, 1930 [1889].
